Emergency Breakaway during an At-Sea Replenishment between
USS Kawishiwi AO-146  & USS Hancock CVA-19
...
Review Hancock report at  Jack's Hancock Web site.

Hancock was the last carrier in the Pacific to have piston aircraft. All tankers had long since converted their amidships tanks to JP-5. Kawishiwi however had the correct tank top on her 4 (amidships) centerline tanks and her inert cofferdams were intact; so before deployment we certified and loaded with AVGAS.                  James Barton LT 75-77 Chief Engineer USS Kawishiwi AO-146

A collision, by definition, is where more than one body accidentlly comes together. Ships, as a whole, are made up within a single hull. This encounter has not said the hulls came together. Structures extending from each ship came together and held the whole ships apart, avoiding a collision. Vern



I was on that deployment as as Chief Engineer on Kawishiwi. I was in Liquid Cargo Central during the incident. Ron Keiser, who at the time was First Lieutenant, did the investigation of the incident. Kawishiwi had been configured to carry aviation gasoline on that cruise, specifically to support Hancock which was the last carrier in the Pacific to have piston aircraft. All tankers had long since converted their amidships tanks to JP-5. We however had the correct tank top on our 4 (amidships) centerline tank and our inert cofferdams were intact; so before deployment we certified and loaded with AVGAS.

Kawishiwi suffered a gyro repeater failure. The helmsman and conning officer didn’t catch it until we started swinging into Hancock. Both CO’s did a great job in maneuvering and a collision was avoided but not before we severed fueling lines and ripped the AVGAS station out of the deck of Hancock.  It was miraculous that the “near miss” did not result in a greater disaster. The story goes that Kawishiwi had been specifically configured to carry aviation gasoline (AVGAS) on that cruise in order to support Hancock which was the last carrier in the Pacific to have piston aircraft. Due to a conversation at a golf game in
Hawaii between CINCPACFLT and COM7THFLT. As the sea story goes, the 7th Fleet admiral complained to CINCPACFLT that the only tankers carrying AVGAS were “civilian” tankers, from the Military Sealift Command. He wanted to be supported by navy tankers.

Who knows whether this is urban legend or the truth; but one thing led to another and the word came down to the pier in our home port of Pearl Harbor to look into re-configuration. All US Navy tankers had long since converted their amidships tanks to JP-5. All centerline tanks carried aviation fuel. Our wing tanks carried cargo fuel. There were 24 tanks in all. I was not very keen on the idea of re-configuring. Ponchatoula and Hassayampa had a bunch of limitations that did not allow them to re-configure quickly. Later, the Chief Engineers of both ships told me they arranged it so they could not re-configure. We weren’t as quick on the uptakes I guess and we had the correct tank top on our 4 (amidships) centerline tank (although it had to be re-worked). Plus our inert cofferdams were intact; so before deployment we certified and loaded with AVGAS. To make things worse, some brilliant staff planner also decided to configure us with CONEX refrigerated boxes and their huge electric motors on the O-1 level right above the 4 centerline tank.

AVGAS was bad stuff and loading out with AVGAS was a real pain for us tanker sailors. I imagine it was for you carrier sailors as well.

Every time we came into Subic Bay for an extended period, we either had to tie up at the fuel pier; or worse, we had to first go to the fuel pier; then go back out to sea to clean and gas free the tank before returning to a naval station pier.  In liberty ports we had to anchor in the explosive anchorages, seemingly a million miles from the port. At sea when transferring, we had to set condition ”red” which meant securing all weather deck doors, securing electric motors and use non-sparking tools. That also meant securing the CONEX boxes for the duration. If we expected a long UNREP, that meant an all-hands working party to download the frozen food so it wouldn’t spoil. Ah, what we did for our Hancock mates! I could have killed that staff officer. Anyway, the transfer of the stuff was done with extreme care. The fittings and rigs used in the transfer were all specially suited for AVGAS. The fuel gave off a real noxious odor and the fumes tend to hide in low spots.

There have been many documented disasters with AVGAS. I mentioned USS Ashtabula. On November 30, 1952, Ashtabula was completing an upkeep period alongside repair ship Ajax when tragedy struck. In the early afternoon, gasoline fumes in two of the forward tanks ignited and the force of the explosion caused the 01 deck to curl back to the superstructure. Several storerooms and bulkheads were destroyed. A portion of the port side hull split allowing sea water to rush in and deck equipment was thrown from the deck into the water. Six people lost their lives. Another famous AVGAS incident that worked in our favor occurred in WWII during the Battle of the Philippine Sea when US torpedo planes set off AVGAS vapor explosions on the Japanese carriers Taihō, Shōkaku, and Hiyo which subsequently sank.

 
So, as Paul Harvey says, so much for the “rest of the story.” It is amazing I can still recall the events. UNQUOTE

 James Barton LT 75-77 Chief Engineer USS Kawishiwi AO-146


"The story what happened on the bridge is factually questionable because of how fast the whole thing was hushed up. Very shortly after we tied up to the pier after that incident they put down liberty call for the crew (unheard of at 10am!). After that there was never an "official" statement (that we heard, anyway) about what caused it. However, the Kawishiwi was a fairly small ship (we had a crew of about 250), there were few real secrets aboard her. I do believe as fact that the "Special K" had gotten 6 degrees off course and the helmsman simply put her back on it without consulting anyone. I know for certain that there were no problems with the engineering plant until All Back Emergency was ordered.

The experience definitely left a lasting impression on me - I'll never forget looking UP to see the Hancock's flightdeck... "

Doug Covill, EM 73-76


"Lt. Barton's version comports best with my memory.  He said " Kawishiwi suffered a gyro repeater failure. The helmsman and conning officer didn’t catch it until we started swinging into Hancock."
I was on Generator watch & MMFN Midling was on throttles.  We got an emergency back full command which requires that the aft throttles be opened at the same time the forward throttles were closed. This is a very tricky maneuver because the steam requirements of the two throttles were different. Changing your steam requirements too quickly could cause the feed water levels in the boilers to change too rapidly and you run the risk of the boilers shutting down, leaving the ship without propulsion or power.  You can't run the boilers w/o power and you can't run the generators w/o steam.  So to pull this off you've got the BTs watching the feed water levels, Midling spinning two throttle wheels at once and me holding in the trips on the generators so they wouldn't go off line. I really remember the emergency back full, but none of the wheel house guys' stories mention it.
 
My recollection of the cause given was that during the UnRep, the Hancock was 6 degrees off course going away from us. We corrected but didn't mention it because we thought we had been off. Then the Hancock realized they were off and corrected, bringing  them back toward us. Since we had all that AVGAS (which I understood was in the forward tanks) we did an emergency back full which brought the Hancock across our bow. I can't remember now the name of the Deck guy who had to use some kind of shotgun powered cutting tool to sever the forward cable because it wouldn't release and was dragging the Hancock into our bow.  I had never heard that any part of the Kawishiwi struck any part of the Hancock.  Why nobody ever looked at the UnRep sheet to see what our heading was supposed to be (and thus show who was off course), probably explains why the whole thing was quietly handled.
 
The whole thing happened quickly and I never heard of any official report. I do know that myself and several other young sailors who were on duty during this incident, who had been demoted a rank for some shit we did in Subic, were quietly given back our Crow's. I still have the Special "K" plaque several of us were given."

Philipp C. Theune MM3 74-75


Email to Jake  01-14-05

Thanks for the E-mail. The definitive source on this is going to be from CDR Ron Keiser (USN-ret) who did the JAG investigation and the log books from the respective ships. We can leave it up to God but the logs will show how the official event was recorded at the time. The command histories will portray it as well. There was no hanky panky in the JAG investigation, at least from the Kawishiwi side. Ron did a thorough job.

I have visited your site frequently. I love a good sea story and both sites are full of good ones. If we are looking for historical accuracy, I wouldn't trust anyone's memory, mine or the late Master Chief's. Each one of us sees it through the haze as well as from our own perspective during the event. BM1 Shipley and NCCM Johnson disagree. I tend to go with BM1 Shipley. One thing in the Master Chief's version for sure which is incorrect is the cause of the collision. It was not a loss of power. It was a helm gyro repeater failure.

Like the Master Chief, I too was on deck during the event, first in Cargo Central (port side O-1 level) then on the O-1 level itself outside near the amidships station to secure pumping and to get the rigs in. There is no question that this was an extraordinary event. The Master Chief's characterization of the event is just fine: "a full blown collision event." It just depends on what is meant by that. There could have been a scraping on Kawishiwi's superstructure near the CPO quarters as he describes it. He is right that CPO berthing, the mess and the pantry were located on the O-1 level port side (between frames 88-117). I just don't remember it.

There is no question that damage occurred though. Hancock's fueling riser forward of the elevator was literally ripped from the deck as the ships came apart. I watched that happen. The good news is that we had secured pumping AVGAS and only the amount contained in the hose spilled. We lost that entire rig. It swung back and struck Hancock's elevator. It then nailed our port side a few times before we got it under control. We didn't do well amidships or aft either. Number 8 pumping station is located just forward of the after deck house. I know that rig struck us several times in the vicinity of CPO berthing. All of those rigs were destroyed or snaked and useless; not from the ships colliding but from the forces of being rapidly pulled apart. We lost the ability to refuel from the port side until we could re-rig. Through Herculean effort by the Deck Apes, I believe that was the next day. General Quarters was sounded and I delayed going to Main Control (I was Chief Engineer) sending the MPA there in my place until I was sure we were out of trouble with the rigs. Fortunately no lives were lost. 

There is no question that this was not simply an emergency breakaway. I agree with the Master Chief on that score. His sea story is very colorful and makes a great read. What is at issue is whether the two ships had skin to skin contact which would constitute a collision. The sea stories you have posted are all good reading.

I think the action taken by the two bridges was extraordinary and their combined skill prevented an even greater disaster. I simply don't see any evidence of a collision by the true definition of that word. My memory of the event doesn't register one and I don't recall there being any damage other than that to the rigs which I described. If the ships hit, where was the damage to Kawishiwi, particularly damage from an elevator?

The bottom line is that Kawishiwi was at fault. I didn't remember it that way until I talked with Ron. The investigation he did showed that the helm gyro repeater failed and the helmsman followed the course drifting to port. For years I remembered it as a helm failure in Hancock until it dawned on me I was remembering another incident on another ship where we did collide.

In the case of Hancock-Kawishiwi, the Conn caught the error (not the Kawishiwi helmsman as reported by one person) and then the two captains executed the emergency maneuvers to keep the ships apart.

I think the log books would confirm it one way or the other. I haven't gotten back to the National Records Center in Suitland yet; but I will. I'll look at the Hancock's log as well. Until that happens, let's just let everyone tell it as he remembers it, ideally over a beer. If the log shows we collided, I stand corrected. Until then I stand by my version of the event.

All the best, Jim Barton


Another great story from another shipmate and from a Snipe to boot!

Phil is right on the mark about the care that needed to be taken when executing an emergency back bell, particularly during that time frame. It wasn’t until the end of the 1975 deployment that we figured out why we were getting so many low water casualties to the boilers. It had to do with an improperly installed valve off the Distilled Water Tank, which provided the head pressure to the Main Feed Pumps. Not only did we have the differences in the two engines as accurately described by Phil, it was severely compounded by the improper installation. It always happened when the plan was cross-connected (which is the way that MMCM “Red” Carpenter preferred it when I reported on board in February 1975). We had more than one incident of low water triggered by changing of bells. In this extraordinary event, Phil and Midling did an incredible job during this casualty. As far as getting busted for events in Subic and quietly restoring his crow, I don’t remember that. As I recall, Phil got a 3 month suspended bust for events ashore. He must have been a good boy for 3 months so he got to keep his crow but had to suffer the indignity of being treated like an FN. He was a good engineer. Because of his actions however, Captain Hogan may have seen fit to terminate the suspension early.

As far as AVGAS, it was in the 4 Centerline tank but we were pumping through the forward station. He is right about the Deck Apes, led by the Bosun (Bill Speir or was it Tom Mclamb?), who did an incredible job. I too have my Special “K” plaque as well as a clock/barometer set the Snipes gave me when I left Kawishiwi in 1977. I cherish all of those mementos and the memories.

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