Hancock was the last carrier in the
Pacific to have piston aircraft. All tankers had long since converted
their amidships tanks to JP-5. Kawishiwi however had the correct tank
top on her 4 (amidships) centerline tanks and her inert cofferdams were
intact; so before deployment we certified and loaded with AVGAS.
James Barton LT 75-77
Chief Engineer USS Kawishiwi
AO-146
A collision, by definition, is where
more than one body accidentlly comes together. Ships, as a whole, are
made up within a single hull. This encounter has not said the hulls
came together. Structures extending from each ship came together and
held the whole ships apart, avoiding a collision. Vern
I was on that deployment as as
Chief Engineer on Kawishiwi.
I was in Liquid Cargo Central during the incident. Ron Keiser, who at the time was First Lieutenant,
did the investigation of the incident. Kawishiwi
had been
configured to carry aviation gasoline on that cruise, specifically to
support Hancock which was the last carrier in the Pacific to have
piston aircraft. All tankers had long since converted their amidships
tanks to JP-5. We however had the correct tank top on our 4 (amidships)
centerline tank and our inert cofferdams were intact; so before
deployment we certified and loaded with AVGAS.
Kawishiwi suffered a gyro repeater failure. The helmsman and conning
officer didn’t catch it until we started swinging into Hancock. Both
CO’s did a great job in maneuvering and a collision was avoided but not
before we severed fueling lines and ripped the AVGAS station out of the
deck of Hancock. It was miraculous that the “near miss” did not
result in a greater disaster. The story goes that Kawishiwi had been
specifically configured to carry aviation gasoline (AVGAS) on that
cruise in order to support Hancock which was the last carrier in the
Pacific to have piston aircraft. Due to a conversation at a golf game
in Hawaii
between CINCPACFLT and
COM7THFLT. As the sea story goes, the 7th Fleet admiral complained to
CINCPACFLT that the only tankers carrying AVGAS were “civilian”
tankers, from the Military Sealift Command. He wanted to be supported
by navy tankers.
Who knows
whether this is urban legend or the truth; but one thing led to another
and the word came down to the pier in our home port
of Pearl Harbor to look
into re-configuration. All US Navy tankers had long since converted
their amidships tanks to JP-5. All centerline tanks carried aviation
fuel. Our wing tanks carried cargo fuel. There were 24 tanks in all. I
was not very keen on the idea of re-configuring. Ponchatoula and
Hassayampa had a bunch of limitations that did not allow them to
re-configure quickly. Later, the Chief Engineers of both ships told me
they arranged it so they could not re-configure. We weren’t as quick on
the uptakes I guess and we had the correct tank top on our 4
(amidships) centerline tank (although it had to be re-worked). Plus our
inert cofferdams were intact; so before deployment we certified and
loaded with AVGAS. To make things worse, some brilliant staff planner
also decided to configure us with CONEX refrigerated boxes and their
huge electric motors on the O-1 level right above the 4 centerline tank.
AVGAS was bad stuff and loading out with AVGAS was a real pain for us
tanker sailors. I imagine it was for you carrier sailors as well.
Every time we came into Subic Bay for an
extended period, we either had to tie up at the fuel pier; or worse, we
had to first go to the fuel pier; then go back out to sea to clean and
gas free the tank before returning to a naval station pier. In
liberty ports we had to anchor in the explosive anchorages, seemingly a
million miles from the port. At sea when transferring, we had to set
condition ”red” which meant securing all weather deck doors, securing
electric motors and use non-sparking tools. That also meant securing
the CONEX boxes for the duration. If we expected a long UNREP, that
meant an all-hands working party to download the frozen food so it
wouldn’t spoil. Ah, what we did for our Hancock mates! I could have
killed that staff officer. Anyway, the transfer of the stuff was done
with extreme care. The fittings and rigs used in the transfer were all
specially suited for AVGAS. The fuel gave off a real noxious odor and
the fumes tend to hide in low spots.
There have been many documented disasters with AVGAS. I mentioned USS
Ashtabula. On November 30,
1952, Ashtabula
was completing an upkeep period alongside repair ship Ajax
when tragedy struck. In the early afternoon, gasoline fumes in two of
the forward tanks ignited and the force of the explosion caused the 01
deck to curl back to the superstructure. Several storerooms and
bulkheads were destroyed. A portion of the port side hull split
allowing sea water to rush in and deck equipment was thrown from the
deck into the water. Six people lost their lives. Another famous AVGAS
incident that worked in our favor occurred in WWII during the Battle
of the Philippine Sea when US torpedo planes
set off AVGAS vapor explosions on the Japanese carriers Taihō, Shōkaku,
and Hiyo which subsequently sank.
So, as Paul Harvey says, so
much for the “rest of the story.” It is amazing I can still recall the
events. UNQUOTE
James Barton LT 75-77 Chief
Engineer USS Kawishiwi AO-146
"The story what happened on the
bridge is factually questionable because of how fast the whole thing
was hushed up. Very shortly after we tied up to the pier after that
incident they put down liberty call for the crew (unheard of at 10am!).
After that there was never an "official" statement (that we heard,
anyway) about what caused it. However, the Kawishiwi was a fairly small
ship (we had a crew of about 250), there were few real secrets aboard
her. I do believe as fact that the "Special K" had gotten 6 degrees off
course and the helmsman simply put her back on it without consulting
anyone. I know for certain that there were no problems with the
engineering plant until All Back Emergency was ordered.
The experience definitely left a
lasting impression on me - I'll never forget looking UP to see the
Hancock's flightdeck... "
Doug Covill, EM
73-76
"Lt. Barton's version comports
best with my memory. He
said " Kawishiwi suffered a gyro repeater failure. The helmsman and
conning officer didn’t catch it until we started swinging into Hancock."
I was on Generator watch &
MMFN Midling was on throttles. We got an emergency back full
command which requires that the aft throttles be opened at the same
time the forward throttles were closed. This is a very tricky maneuver
because the steam requirements of the two throttles were different.
Changing your steam requirements too quickly could cause the feed water
levels in the boilers to change too rapidly and you run the risk of the
boilers shutting down, leaving the ship without propulsion or
power. You can't run the boilers w/o power and you can't run the
generators w/o steam. So to pull this off you've got the BTs
watching the feed water levels, Midling spinning two throttle wheels at
once and me holding in the trips on the generators so they wouldn't go
off line. I really remember the emergency back full, but none of the
wheel house guys' stories mention it.
My recollection of the cause
given was that during the UnRep, the Hancock was 6 degrees off
course going away from us. We corrected but didn't mention it because
we thought we had been off. Then the Hancock realized they were off and
corrected, bringing them back toward us. Since we had all that
AVGAS (which I understood was in the forward tanks) we did an emergency
back full which brought the Hancock across our bow. I can't remember
now the name of the Deck guy who had to use some kind of shotgun
powered cutting tool to sever the forward cable because it
wouldn't release and was dragging the Hancock into our bow.
I had never heard that any part of the Kawishiwi struck any part of the
Hancock. Why nobody ever looked at the UnRep sheet to see what
our heading was supposed to be (and thus show who was off course),
probably explains why the whole thing was quietly handled.
The whole thing happened quickly
and I never heard of any official report. I do know that myself and
several other young sailors who were on duty during this
incident, who had been demoted a rank for some shit we did in
Subic, were quietly given back our Crow's. I still have the Special "K"
plaque several of us were given."
Philipp
C. Theune MM3 74-75
Email to
Jake 01-14-05
Thanks
for the E-mail. The definitive source on this is going to be from CDR
Ron Keiser (USN-ret) who did the JAG investigation and the log books
from the respective ships. We can leave it up to God but the logs will
show how the official event was recorded at the time. The command
histories will portray it as well. There was no hanky panky in the JAG
investigation, at least from the Kawishiwi side. Ron did a thorough job.
I have visited your site frequently. I love a good sea story and both
sites are full of good ones. If we are looking for historical accuracy,
I wouldn't trust anyone's memory, mine or the late Master Chief's. Each
one of us sees it through the haze as well as from our own perspective
during the event. BM1 Shipley and NCCM Johnson disagree. I tend to go
with BM1 Shipley. One thing in the Master Chief's version for sure
which is incorrect is the cause of the collision. It was not a loss of
power. It was a helm gyro repeater failure.
Like the Master Chief, I too was on deck during the event, first in
Cargo Central (port side O-1 level) then on the O-1 level itself
outside near the amidships station to secure pumping and to get the
rigs in. There is no question that this was an extraordinary event. The
Master Chief's characterization of the event is just fine: "a full
blown collision event." It just depends on what is meant by that. There
could have been a scraping on Kawishiwi's superstructure near the CPO
quarters as he describes it. He is right that CPO berthing, the mess
and the pantry were located on the O-1 level port side (between frames
88-117). I just don't remember it.
There is no question that damage occurred though. Hancock's fueling
riser forward of the elevator was literally ripped from the deck as the
ships came apart. I watched that happen. The good news is that we had
secured pumping AVGAS and only the amount contained in the hose
spilled. We lost that entire rig. It swung back and struck Hancock's
elevator. It then nailed our port side a few times before we got it
under control. We didn't do well amidships or aft either. Number 8
pumping station is located just forward of the after deck house. I know
that rig struck us several times in the vicinity of CPO berthing. All
of those rigs were destroyed or snaked and useless; not from the ships
colliding but from the forces of being rapidly pulled apart. We lost
the ability to refuel from the port side until we could re-rig. Through
Herculean effort by the Deck Apes, I believe that was the next day.
General Quarters was sounded and I delayed going to Main Control (I was
Chief Engineer) sending the MPA there in my place until I was sure we
were out of trouble with the rigs. Fortunately no lives were
lost.
There is no question that this was not simply an emergency breakaway. I
agree with the Master Chief on that score. His sea story is very
colorful and makes a great read. What is at issue is whether the two
ships had skin to skin contact which would constitute a collision. The
sea stories you have posted are all good reading.
I think the action taken by the two bridges was extraordinary and their
combined skill prevented an even greater disaster. I simply don't see
any evidence of a collision by the true definition of that word. My
memory of the event doesn't register one and I don't recall there being
any damage other than that to the rigs which I described. If the ships
hit, where was the damage to Kawishiwi, particularly damage from an
elevator?
The bottom line
is that Kawishiwi was at fault. I didn't remember it that way until I
talked with Ron. The investigation he did showed that the helm gyro
repeater failed and the helmsman followed the course drifting to port.
For years I remembered it as a helm failure in Hancock until it dawned
on me I was remembering another incident on another ship where we did
collide.
In the case of
Hancock-Kawishiwi, the Conn
caught the error (not the Kawishiwi helmsman as reported by one person)
and then the two captains executed the emergency maneuvers to keep the
ships apart.
I think the log
books would confirm it one way or the other. I haven't gotten back to
the National Records
Center in Suitland
yet; but I will. I'll look at the Hancock's log as well. Until that
happens, let's just let everyone tell it as he remembers it, ideally
over a beer. If the log shows we collided, I stand corrected. Until
then I stand by my version of the event.
All
the best, Jim Barton
Another great
story from another shipmate and from a Snipe to boot!
Phil is right
on the mark about the care that needed to be taken when executing an
emergency back bell, particularly during that time frame. It wasn’t
until the end of the 1975 deployment that we figured out why we were
getting so many low water casualties to the boilers. It had to do with
an improperly installed valve off the Distilled Water Tank, which
provided the head pressure to the Main Feed Pumps. Not only did we have
the differences in the two engines as accurately described by Phil, it
was severely compounded by the improper installation. It always
happened when the plan was cross-connected (which is the way that MMCM
“Red” Carpenter preferred it when I reported on board in February
1975). We had more than one incident of low water triggered by changing
of bells. In this extraordinary event, Phil and Midling did an
incredible job during this casualty. As far as getting busted for
events in Subic and quietly restoring his crow,
I don’t remember that. As I recall, Phil got a 3 month suspended bust
for events ashore. He must have been a good boy for 3 months so he got
to keep his crow but had to suffer the indignity of being treated like
an FN. He was a good engineer. Because of his actions however, Captain
Hogan may have seen fit to terminate the suspension early.
As far as
AVGAS, it was in the 4 Centerline tank but we were pumping through the
forward station. He is right about the Deck Apes, led by the Bosun
(Bill Speir or was it Tom Mclamb?), who did an incredible job. I too
have my Special “K” plaque as well as a clock/barometer set the Snipes
gave me when I left Kawishiwi in 1977. I cherish all of those mementos
and the memories.
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